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Abstract 
In  the  context  of  policy  reforms  in  the  1990s  in  general  and  three  important 
amendments  made  to  the  Indian  Patent  Act  (1970)  in  1999,  2002  and  2005  in 
particular, the present paper makes an attempt to examine the impact of MA on 
financial  performance  of  Indian  pharmaceutical  companies.  It  is  found  that  the 
profitability of a firm depends directly on its size, selling efforts and exports and 
imports  intensities  but  inversely  on  their  market  share  and  demand  for  the 
products. However, MA do not have any significant impact on profitability of the 
firms in the long run possibly due to the resultant X-inefficiency and entry of new 
firms into the market. In addition, in-house R&D and foreign technology purchase 
also do not have any significant impact on profitability of the firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Introduction of deregulatory policy measures in general and competition policies in 
particular  since  1991  have  resulted  in  a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of 
mergers  and  acquisitions  (MA)
1  in  Indian  corporate  sector  (e.g.,  Khanna,  1997; 
Venkiteswaran, 1997; Chandrasekhar, 1999; Roy, 1999; Basant, 2000; Beena, 2000, 
2004 & 2008, Das, 2000; Kumar, 2000; Agarwal, 2002; Dasgupta, 2004; Mishra, 
2005;  Agarwal  and  Bhattacharya,  2006;  Mantravadi  and  Reddy,  2008).  While 
majority of these deals are horizontal in nature (Khanna, 1997; Beena 2000 & 2008; 
Mishra, 2005), the number vary significantly across the industries (Basant, 2000; 
Das,  2000;  Dasgupta,  2004;  Agarwal,  2002;  Mishra,  2005).  The  broad  industry 
groups that experienced a large number of MA include financial and other services, 
chemicals including drugs and pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery, electronics 
and  beverages  including  spirits  and  vinegars,  etc.  (Basant,  2000;  Das,  2000; 
Agarwal, 2002, Mishra, 2005)
2. 
There are two broad theories explaining why firms acquire other firms or merge 
with other firm. The monopoly theory postulates that the firms use the route MA 
to raise their market power (Steiner, 1975, Chatterjee, 1986), whereas, according 
to the efficiency theory, MA are planned and executed to reduce costs by achieving 
scale economies (Porter, 1985; Shelton, 1988)
3. Either way firms are expected to 
have better financial performance following MA. Many of the existing studies (e.g., 
Healy  et  al.  1992;  Grabowski  et  al.,  1995;  Switzer,  1996;  Waldfogel  and  Smart, 
1994; Vander, 1996) empirically support the proposition that MA lead to better 
financial performance of the firms. Contrary to this, there are also studies (e.g., 
Dickerson et al., 1997; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987a and 1987b; Mueller, 1985; 
Ghosh, 2001) that report results at odds with the view that MA improve corporate 
performance.  Further,  Ikeda  and  Doi  (1983),  Cosh  et  al  (1984),  Kumar  (1984), 
Geroski (1988), Odagiri (1992) also find either such negative results or little changes 
in operating performance following MA.  
Thus, the existing studies report mixed impact of MA on financial performance of 
the  firms,  with  the  findings  ranging  from  slightly  positive  improvement  to 
significantly negative or no improvement. This raises an important question; has 
the  wave  of  MA  in  the  post-reform  era  helped  Indian  firms  in  improving  their 
financial  performance?  While  addressing  this  question  is  very  important  to 
understand  the  implications  of  the  wave  of  MA,  the  research  on  financial 
                                                           
1 Although mergers and acquisitions are different in their definitions and the statutory procedures, their 
effects from an economic perspective are the same as in both the cases the control of one company 
passes on to another. So, in the present paper, no distinction is made between the mergers and the 
acquisitions. 
2 The incidence was, however, much less in the industries like wood and wood products, paper and 
paper products, electricity, construction activities, etc (Basant, 2000; Mishra, 2005).  
3 These scale economies may arise at the plant level (Pratten, 1971) or as a result of operating several 
firms within one firm (Scherer et al., 1975). In either case, MAs bring together firms, which individually 
fall short of the minimum efficient scale. Mergers, Acquisitions and Firms’ Performance: Experience of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
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performance following MA in India so far is very limited. Besides, although most of 
these existing studies (e.g., Pawaskar, 2001; Beena, 2004; Mantravadi and Reddy, 
2008) find decline or very little increase in post-merger profitability, their empirical 
testing is based on either small sample of deals (e.g., Pawaskar, 2001) or shorter 
time-frame  (e.g.,  Beena,  2004).  A  small  sample  fails  to  capture  adequately  the 
variations in impact of MA,  especially, when the  sample is drawn from diverse 
product  groups/industries  (e.g.,  Mantravadi  and  Reddy,  2008).  A  shorter 
timeframe,  on  the  other  hand,  undermines  the  process  of  adjustment  and  the 
conclusion on impact therefore may be misleading. Further, a better understanding 
of  the  impact  of  MA  on  financial  performance  also  requires  controlling  for  the 
influence  of  various  structure,  conduct  (other  than  MA)  and  policy  related 
variables, which is missing in the existing studies. 
In this perspective, the present paper makes an attempt to examine the impact of 
MA on financial performance of pharmaceutical companies with a sample of 52 
firms  over  the  period  of  2000-01  to  2007-08  by  using  the  multi-directional 
structure-conduct-performance-policy  relationships.  The  reasons  for  selecting 
pharmaceutical  industry  are  of  many  folds.    First,  drugs  and  pharmaceutical 
industry  appears  to  be  one  of  the  most  active  sectors  in  the  game  of  MA 
accounting  for  about  8.6  per  cent  of  total  mergers  and  11.6  per  cent  of  total 
acquisitions  in  the  1990s  and  majority  of  these  MA  were  horizontal  in  nature 
(Mishra, 2005). Second, the wave of MA in Indian pharmaceutical industry did not 
help the firms much in raising their market share
4. This contradicts with the basic 
proposition of the monopoly theory that the firms use the route MA to raise their 
market power (Steiner, 1975, Chatterjee, 1986)
5. But, as a large number of deals in 
the  industry  were  guided  by  the  motives  of  business  consolidation  and 
strengthening R&D bases, the firms may be benefited through efficiency gains.  
Third, since the market remain highly competitive despite the wave of MA, Mishra 
(2006)  infer  that  MA  have  very  little  impact  on  performance  of  Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, rather performance of industry is determined mainly by 
the extent of market concentration, import competition, marketing expenses and 
technology  strategies  by  the  firms.  However,  such  inference  on  causal  linkages 
between MA and performance is not empirically verified.  
Finally,  the  Pharmaceutical  Policy  (2002)  is  expected  to  ensure  availability  of 
abundant good quality and essential drugs, strengthening indigenous capabilities 
and quality control system, creating a framework to encourage new investment 
                                                           
4 Although the industry recorded a considerable increase in market concentration in the 1990s mainly 
due to its low base, the level of concentration is still very low as compared to what is observed in many 
other industries, leaving the market structure highly competitive (Mishra, 2006). 
5 In fact, the structure of Indian pharmaceutical market seems to be determined largely by a set of 
conduct (other than MA), performance and policy related variables, in addition to various demand-
supply related market conditions and horizontally differentiated product structure (Mishra, 2006). Pulak MISHRA & Tamal CHANDRA 
 
 
Page | 114                                                                               EJBE 2010, 3(5) 
and  new  technologies,  increasing  exports  by  reducing  barriers  to  international 
trade, and encouraging R&D compatible with the country’s needs particularly in the 
context  of  the  commitment  regarding  TRIPS  Agreement
6.  This  coupled  with 
delicensing of the sector, removal of a large number of drugs from price control, 
and  three  important  amendments  to  the  Indian  Patent  Act  (1970)  by  the 
parliament before TRIPS became effective in 2005, viz., Patent First Amendment 
Act in 1999, Patent (Second Amendment) Bill in 2002 and Patent (Amendment) Bill 
in 2005 have made a marked shift from the process patent regime towards an era 
of product patent.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section II specifies the 
functional model applied in the present paper and discusses the possible impact of 
MA on firms’ performance controlling for that of other variables. Section III deals 
with the methodology and the data used. Section IV analyses the empirical results 
and Section V concludes the paper. 
2. Specification of Functional Model 
The impact of MA on financial performance of the firms can be examined by using 
the  structure-conduct-performance  (SCP)  framework.  The  traditional  SCP 
paradigm, based on the early work of Edward Mason (1939) and developed further 
by Bain (1959), postulates a unidirectional relationship between market structure, 
conduct and performance. However, the successive developments in the industrial 
organization  literature  have  resulted  in  multidirectional  structure-conduct-
performance-policy relationships (Scherer and Ross, 1990). In the new framework, 
the  causal  relationships  amongst  structure,  conduct  and  performance  are  not 
necessarily  be  unidirectional.  Instead,  dual  causalities  between  structure  and 
conduct,  between  conduct  and  performance,  and  between  structure  and 
performance are very likely. Another important development in the modern SCP 
paradigm is inclusion of public policies relating to taxes, subsidies, international 
trade,  investment,  etc.  Further,  the  relationships  may  not  necessarily  be 
instantaneous  in  nature  (Kambhampati,  1996)  and  there  may  be  lagged 
relationships amongst many of the constituent variables. 
Seen  in  this  line,  let  us  assume  that  current  profitability  (PROFt)  of  a  firm  is  a 
function of its current size (FSZt), current market size (MSZt) current market share 
(SHAREt), lagged mergers and acquisitions (MAt-1), lagged selling intensity (SELLt-1), 
lagged R&D intensity (RDt-1), lagged foreign technology purchase intensity (FTECHt-
1), current export intensity (EXPt), and current import intensity (IMPt), i.e.,  
it it it
t i t i t i t i it it it it
u IMP EXP
FTPI RD SELL MA SHARE MSZ FSZ PFOR
+ +
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Here, MSZt is used as a proxy for demand for the firms’ product. On the other hand, 
FSZt, SHAREt and IMPt stand for structural aspects of the market, MAt-1, SELLt-1, RDt-
1, FTECHt-1, EXPt and IMPt for firms’ conducts and EXPt for their performance. In 
addition, MAt-1 is also likely to capture changes in investment policies in general 
and competition policy in particular. Similarly, EXPt and IMPt are also expected to 
capture the impact of trade related policy changes on performance of the firms. 
Further, the present paper uses two alternatives measures of profitability, viz., the 
ratio of profit before interest and taxes to sales (PBIT) and the ratio of profit after 
taxes (PAT) to sales to substantiate the findings. 
2.1. Possible Impact of the Independent Variables  
Current  Firm  Size  (FSZt):  Firm  size  is  generally  hypothesized  to  have  a  positive 
impact on profit rates due to scale economies and other efficiencies associated 
with large-firm size (Hall and Weiss, 1967; Scherer, 1973; Majumdar, 1997). In a 
competitive  market  like  Indian  pharmaceutical  industry  with  little  difference  in 
market share and availability of large number of alternatives, efficiency gains from 
being larger in size help a firm to raise its profitability. This is particularly so as the 
prices of a number of medicines are still controlled.   
Current Market Size (MSZt): As pointed out earlier, in the present paper current 
market  size  of  a  firm  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  demand  for  its  product.  It  is 
expected that the firms with greater market demand will have greater profitability. 
However, when firms reduce prices to raise market demand for their products or 
restrict entry, they may not necessarily experience greater profitability.  
Current Market Share (SHAREt): The basic theory of industrial economics suggests 
that high market share raises profitability. However, such a positive relationship 
between market share and profitability may not be so straight forward. Feeny and 
Rogers (1999) find a U-shaped relationship between market share and profitability. 
This may be so when the objective of the firm is to grow in size through greater 
market penetration. In this case, higher market share may be a consequence of 
lower prices  charged by the firm. Further, higher market share may  encourage 
entry of new firms or results in X-inefficiency of the existing ones. So, in the long 
run,  market  share  may  not  have  any  significant  impact  on  profitability.  For 
example,  McDonald  (1999)  fails  to  find  any  significant  relationship  between 
profitability and market share of Australian manufacturing firms. 
Mergers  and  Acquisitions  (MAt-1):  According  to  the  efficiency  theory,  MA  are 
planned  and  executed  for  reducing  costs  by  achieving  scale  economies  (Porter, 
1985; Shelton, 1988). The monopoly theory, on the other hand, considers MA as 
the routes to raise market power (Steiner, 1975, Chatterjee, 1986). Therefore, one 
may expect MA to help the firms to improve their financial performance through 
greater market power and efficiency gains. However, in addition to MA, market 
power of a firm may also be influenced by number and size distribution of firms in Pulak MISHRA & Tamal CHANDRA 
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the industry, entry of new firms into the market, extent of import competition, 
expansion of the market, etc. Further, whether a merger or an acquisition will lead 
to greater market power may also depend on the motive of the particular synergy. 
If, for example, a merger or an acquisition is motivated by more efficient operation 
rather  monopoly  power,  it  may  not  lead  to  increase  in  market  concentration 
(Banerjee and Eckward, 1998). Similarly, monopoly power arising out of a merger 
or an acquisition may result in X-inefficiency. This means that, when controlled for 
other factors, a merger or an acquisition may not necessarily improve financial 
performance of the firms. 
Lagged Selling Intensity (SELLt): Selling efforts by a firm that include advertising, 
marketing and distribution may raise its profitability in a number of ways. On the 
one hand, advertising can help the firm to have image advantage over the rivals. 
Advertising can also create entry barriers. Comanor and Wilson (1967) hypothesize 
that industries with high advertising expenditures have high product differentiation 
barriers  to  entry
7.  The  Comanor-Wilson  hypothesis  has  been  tested  extensively 
resulting in a positive relationship between profitability and advertising to sales 
ratio (Scherer and Ross, 1990). On the other hand, firms also spend heavily on 
distribution  and  marketing  activities  to  gain  increased  market  shares,  with  a 
consequent impact on profitability (Majumdar, 1997). Thus, product differentiation 
and image advantage through advertising, coupled with creation of marketing and 
distribution related complementary assets are expected to improve the financial 
performance of a firm. In other words, higher the selling intensity of a firm in any 
year, greater the profitability is likely to be in the next year. 
Lagged R&D Intensity (RDt-1): Product innovations through in-house R&D efforts 
strengthen and extend market orientation while process innovations reduce the 
cost of production. Sustained innovation may also act as an important instrument 
of  maintaining  entry  barriers  (Mueller,  1990)  and  thereby  resulting  in  higher 
profitability in the long run. Cefis (1998) confirms that the firms that are persistent 
innovators continue to innovate and earn above average profit. However, in the 
absence of effective regulation, the extra profit due to innovation may diminish 
when  the  competitors  start  to  imitate  the  products  and  the  processes  of  the 
innovative leading firms. This coupled with the current accounting practices that 
allow  firms  to  express  R&D  expenses  entirely  in  the  year  incurred  instead  of 
amortizing it to recognize its future benefits creates the possibility of  negative 
impact of in-house R&D on - profitability -.  
Lagged  Foreign  Technology  Purchase  Intensity  (FTPt-1):  Acquisition  of  new 
technology helps a firm in lowering operating costs and hence the price (Hinomoto, 
1965; Balcer and Lippman, 1984). It may, therefore, be assumed that acquisition of 
foreign  technology  raises  the  profitability  of  a  firm  by  modifying  the  level  and 
                                                           
7  High  advertising  intensity  may  require  the  potential  entrants  to  incur  disproportionately  high 
advertising expenses to win over the incumbents and this may discourage entry.  Mergers, Acquisitions and Firms’ Performance: Experience of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
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composition  of  its  productive  capacity,  reducing  per  unit  production  costs  and 
enhancing  demand.  Greater  access  to  foreign  technology  not  only  enhances 
competitive  edge  of  the  firm  in  the  market  place,  but  also  helps  it  in  creating 
strategic entry barriers. Firms may purchase foreign technology or they may have 
access  to  the  same  through  licensing,  foreign  investment  and  mergers  and 
acquisitions.  
Current Export Intensity (EXPt): Although there is no specific theory, per-se, which 
links the export-orientation of firms to performance, one may expect the impact of 
exports on observed performance of firm to be positive (Majumdar, 1997). This is 
particularly so when the competition intensity differs between the domestic and 
the  international  marketplace.  Larger  penetration  through  exports  in  the 
international market is backed by greater competitiveness and also provides the 
domestic firm opportunities to operate at optimal scale, especially, when domestic 
demand constraints are present. This helps a firm to reduce its costs of operations 
and hence to raise profitability.  
Current Import Intensity (IMPt-1): With greater penetration of imported goods, a 
firm  can  raise  its  market  share  and  hence  profitability.  Further,  higher  import 
intensity of a firm may also pressurize others to perform better (Majumdar, 1997), 
and failure in this regard may force many of the incumbents to exit the market 
raising  profitability  of  the  existing  firms.  Therefore,  one  may  expect  a  positive 
impact of import intensity on the profitability of a firm. However, the existence of a 
quota system and import licensing, which has been the case in India may engender 
rent-seeking and make the impact of imports on profitability negative. 
3. Methodology and Data 
The above equation is estimated by applying panel data estimation techniques for 
a set of 52 listed drugs and pharmaceutical companies over the period from 2000-
01 to 2007-08. Use of panel data not only helps in raising the sample size and 
hence the degrees of freedom considerably, it also incorporates the dynamics of 
firms’  behavior  in  the  marketplace.  This  is  very  important  in  having  a  better 
understanding of complicated issue like the impact of MA on financial performance 
of  firms.  Necessary  data  on  all  the  variables  are  collected  from  the  PROWESS 
database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), Mumbai.  
We estimate both the fixed effects model (FEM) and the random effects model 
(REM).  While  in  the  FEM  the  intercept  is  allowed  to  vary  across  the  firms  to 
incorporate special characteristics of the cross-sectional units, in REM it is assumed 
that the intercept of an individual is a random drawing from a large population with 
a constant mean value (Gujarati and Sangeetha, 2007).  In other words, in REM the 
intercept  of  an  individual  unit  is  expressed  as  a  deviation  from  the  constant Pulak MISHRA & Tamal CHANDRA 
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population mean. Therefore, the choice between the FEM and the REM is very 
important as it largely influences conclusion
8. 
In the present paper, we apply the test developed by Hausman (1978) to decide 
between  the  FEM  and  REM.  The  test  is  based  on  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
estimators of FEM and REM do not differ significantly and uses a test statistic that 
has an asymptotic c2 distribution. When the null hypothesis is rejected, the FEM is 
better suited as compared to REM. Further, the decision made on the basis of 
Hausman test is verified by using Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier 
test  for  testing  random  individual  effects,  if  any.  The  test  is  based  on  the  null 
hypothesis that the variance of the random disturbance term is zero and uses a test 
statistic that follows c2 distribution. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that 
there are random effects in the relationships. 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
Table  1  gives  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  estimated  model. 
Table 2 and Table 3 represent the regression results of the two estimated models 
by using PBIT and PAT respectively as the dependent variable. It is observed that 
the F-statistic in FEM and the Wald c2 in REM are statistically significant. Further, 
the R2 value is reasonably high in FEM and it is very high in REM. This indicates that 
both the estimated models are statistically significant with high explanatory power. 
However, as mentioned in the earlier section, in order to select between the FEM 
and REM, the present paper applies the test developed by Hausman (1978). 
Table  1:  Summary  Statistics  for  the  Variables  used  in  the  Regression 
Model 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
PBIT  260  38.16  121.19  -120.64  1212.57 
PAT  260  24.95  85.22  -140.55  844.37 
MA  260  0.78  1.25  0.00  7.00 
SELL  260  14.71  32.75  0.00  354.48 
RD  260  2.66  4.23  0.00  31.16 
FTP  260  0.15  0.97  0.00  13.27 
MSZ  260  4.38  2.35  -1.92  8.06 
SHARE  260  1.92  2.94  0.00  16.20 
FSZ  260  4.11  2.23  -2.18  8.20 
EXP  260  21.54  25.62  0.00  123.97 
IMP  260  20.86  47.96  0.00  457.78 
The test statistic as presented in Table 2 and Table 3 are not statistically significant. 
This means that the estimates of REM are appropriate as compared to that of FEM 
                                                           
8 This is so because when the number of cross-sectional units is large and the number of time-series 
units is small, as it  is in the present case, the estimates  obtained by the FEM and REM can differ 
significantly (Gujarati and Sangeetha, 2009). Mergers, Acquisitions and Firms’ Performance: Experience of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
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in  the  present  context.  Further,  the  Breusch-Pagan  c2  test  statistic  is  also 
statistically significant indicating randomness of the relationships. We, therefore, 
use the regression results of the REM for testing the statistical significance of the 
individual coefficients as well as for their interpretation. 
White’s  heteroscedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  are  used  to  compute  z-
statistics of the individual coefficients. This makes the regression results robust, as 
these  standard  errors  control  for  heteroscedasticity.  It  is  observed  that  the 
coefficients  of  FSZ,  SHARE,  MSZ,  SELL,  EXP  and  IMP  are  statistically  significant. 
Further, while the coefficients of SHARE and MSZ are negative that of FSZ, SELL, 
EXP and IMP are positive. This implies that the firms with larger demand for their 
products or larger share in the market have lower profitability. On the other hand, 
the firms that are larger in size or that make greater selling efforts or have higher 
exports and imports intensities experience higher profitability. 
Table 2: Regression Results with PBIT as the Dependent Variable 
Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat  Variable  Coefficient  z-Stat 
Intercept  138.2138  1.32  Intercept  -15.4494  -1.20 
FSZ  40.7814  2.11
**  FSZ  27.0706  2.40
** 
SHARE  -7.9332  -1.35  SHARE  -3.4810  -2.24
** 
MSZ  -67.7423  -1.69
***  MSZ  -23.0511  -2.16
** 
MA  -1.9850  -0.84  MA  3.4304  1.28 
SELL  2.2170  3.14
*  SELL  2.6386  4.02
* 
RD  -5.6641  -2.26
**  RD  -2.4374  -1.26 
FTP  -4.8933  -0.64  FTPI  -7.6865  -0.99 
EXP  1.1666  2.50
**  EXP  0.4720  2.28
** 
IMP  0.1864  0.96  IMP  0.2858  1.72
*** 
F-Statistic  8.49  Wald c
2  169.57 
R
2-Within  0.76  R
2-Within  0.73 
R
2-Between  0.33  R
2-Between  0.85 
R
2-Overall  0.40  R
2-Overall  0.81 
No. of 
Observations 
260  No. of 
Observations 
260 
Hausman c
2  3.32 
Breusch-Pagan c
2  75.72 
 *Statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 **Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
 ***Statistically significant at 10 percent. 
It is interesting to note that the coefficients of MA, RD and FTP are not statistically 
significant. This means that mergers and acquisitions in Indian pharmaceutical firms 
do  not  have  any  statistically  significant  impact  on  their  financial  performance. 
Similarly,  in-house  R&D  efforts  or  purchase  of  foreign  technology  also  do  not 
influence firms’ financial performance in a significant way. Pulak MISHRA & Tamal CHANDRA 
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Table 3: Regression Results with PAT as the Dependent Variable 
Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat  Variable  Coefficient  z-Stat 
Intercept  71.7654  0.87  Intercept  -20.4236  -1.81
*** 
FSZ  27.7219  1.88
***  FSZ  19.3612  2.28
** 
SHARE  -8.0098  -1.62  SHARE  -3.3430  -2.58
** 
MSZ  -40.9989  -1.29  MSZ  -14.6181  -1.71
*** 
MA  -1.9273  -1.12  MA  2.4565  1.18 
SELL  1.5109  2.88
*  SELL  1.7741  3.75
* 
RD  -3.9907  -2.17
**  RD  -1.3290  -0.90 
FTP  -4.1717  -0.75  FTPI  -6.0874  -1.11 
EXP  1.0372  2.90
*  EXP  0.3894  2.48
** 
IMP  0.1139  0.79  IMP  0.2055  1.75
*** 
F-Statistic  8.49
*  Wald c
2  169.57
* 
R
2-Within  0.76  R
2-Within  0.73 
R
2-Between  0.33  R
2-Between  0.85 
R
2-Overall  0.40  R
2-Overall  0.81 
No. of 
Observations 
260  No. of 
Observations 
260 
Hausman c
2  4.34 
Breusch-Pagan c
2  75.34
* 
 *Statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 ** Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
 ***Statistically significant at 10 percent. 
The empirical results presented above suggest that profitability of a firm depends 
inversely on its market  share. Firms  with larger market  share experience lower 
profitability in the long run
9. This may contradict to the general perception that 
larger market share results in higher profitability, but is not surprising. A firm may 
experience lower profitability despite having greater market share due to the entry 
of new firms into the industry and X-inefficiency of the incumbents
10. The firms 
with larger share in the market may enjoy higher profitability in the short run, 
which may encourage new firms to enter into the industry. In the long run, absence 
of  legal  entry  barriers  and  failure  of  the  incumbents  to  create  strategic  entry 
barriers make entry of new firms possible
11 and thereby reduce profitability of the 
incumbents.  Similarly,  when  firms  raise  market  demand  for  their  products  by 
reducing the prices, they may not necessarily experience greater profitability. In 
other  words,  a  firm  with  greater  demand  for  products  in  the  market  may 
experience lower profitability. 
                                                           
9 This finding contradicts with Delorme et al (2002). 
10 Using dynamic panel data model Mishra (2008) observes that the traditional positive concentration-
markup relationship does not hold in a dynamic context when controlled for various structural aspects 
of the market, firms’ strategies and policies of the government. 
11 According to Chaudhuri (2005), the success of one Indian company in a field often induces the entry of 
other Indian companies in the same field. 
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The  larger  firms  are  found  to  record  higher  profitability  possibly  due  to  scale 
economies  and  other  efficiencies  associated  with  large-firm  size.  This  is  quite 
consistent with Hall and Weiss (1967), Scherer (1973) and Majumdar (1997). Thus, 
in  a  competitive  market  like  Indian  pharmaceutical  industry  with  availability  of 
large  number  of  alternatives  and  controlling  of  prices  of  many  of  the  drugs, 
efficiency gains from larger size is very important for a firm to raise its profitability. 
The  firms  with  greater  selling  efforts  experience  larger  profitability  through 
information  dissemination,  product  differentiation,  and  easy  movement  of  the 
products  and  better  reach  to  the  consumers.  This  is  consistent  with  Robinson 
(1933),  Kaldor  (1950),  Bain  (1956)  and  Comanor  and  Wilson  (1974),  though 
contradicts with Greuner et al. (2000) and Delorme et al. (2002). Similarly, firms 
with greater intensity towards exports and imports of final products are found to 
record higher profitability. Such a positive association of profitability with exports 
and imports intensity is consistent with Majumdar (1997). 
Technology strategies of the firms in the form of either in-house R&D or purchase 
of foreign technology do not influence their profitability in a significant way. This 
may largely be due to the low R&D as well as foreign technology purchase intensity 
of most of the pharmaceutical companies operating in India. Further, purchase of 
obsolete  technologies  and  failure  in  innovating  new  products  or  processes  also 
restrict the firms from raising their profitability. 
Interestingly, MA does not have any statistically significant influence on profitability 
of  Indian  pharmaceutical  companies.  In  other  words,  firms  do  not  necessarily 
benefit from MA in terms of profitability in the long-run, which is largely in the line 
of observations made by Ikeda and Doi (1983), Cosh et al (1984), Kumar (1984), 
Geroski (1988) and Odagiri (1992) that either confirm negative results or find little 
changes in operating performance following MA. However, the observation of no 
statistically significant influence of MA on profitability contradicts with the findings 
of Healy et al. (1992), Grabowski et al. (1995), Switzer (1996), Smart and Waldfogel 
(1994)  and  Vander  (1996)  that  MA  improve  corporate  performance.  The 
contradiction  may  largely  be  due  to  multi-directional  structure-conduct-
performance-policy  relationships  used  in  the  present  paper.  As  pointed  out  by 
Scheerer  and  Ross  (1990),  MA  as  business  strategies  influence  firms’  financial 
performance either by enhancing operational efficiency or raising market power. 
But, strategic reactions of other firms or policy intervention of the government may 
limit the benefits through MA. Further, many of the firms use the route of MA to 
consolidate  their  business/operation  or  to  increase  scale  of  operation  for 
enhancing  their  competitiveness  in  the  market.  When  it  is  so,  MA  may  not 
necessarily have significant influence on firms’ profitability
12.  
                                                           
12 In Indian context, using a sample of  - public limited and traded companies between 1991 and 2003, 
Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) find- that there are minor variations in terms of impact on operating Pulak MISHRA & Tamal CHANDRA 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In the context of introduction of large-scale deregulatory policy measures in the 
1990s in general and three important amendments made to the Indian Patent Act 
(1970) in 1999, 2002 and 2005 in particular, the present paper makes an attempt to 
examine  the  impact  of  MA  on  financial  performance  of  Indian  pharmaceutical 
companies. It is found that the profitability of a firm depends directly on its size, 
selling efforts and exports and imports intensities but inversely on their market 
share and demand for the products. In other words, firms larger in size or having 
greater  selling  efforts  or  higher  presence  in  the  international  market  or  larger 
proportion of imported goods in the selling basket experience greater profitability. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  firms  with  greater  demand  for  products  or  larger 
dominance  in  the  domestic  market  record  lower  profitability  in  the  long-run. 
However, MA do not have any significant impact on profitability of the firms in the 
long run possibly due to the resultant X-inefficiency and entry of new firms into the 
market. In addition, in-house R&D and foreign technology purchase also do not 
have any significant impact on profitability of the firms. 
Thus,  Indian  pharmaceutical  firms  fail  to  reap  the  benefits  of  MA  in  terms  of 
profitability.  In  other  words,  MA  in  Indian  pharmaceutical  industry  are  not 
necessarily counterproductive and detrimental to the interests of the consumers. 
Rather, MA may benefit the firms in enhancing their competitiveness and thereby 
facing acute competition from the MNCs. This in turn ensures consumer welfare. 
Improvement  in  efficiency  and  competitiveness  is  reflected  in  large  number  of 
acquisition  of  foreign  firms  abroad  by  Indian  pharmaceutical  companies.  The 
findings of the present paper, therefore, raise an important question, is there any 
necessity to regulate MA in Indian pharmaceutical industry? In other words, should 
there  be  uniform  thresholds  of  assets  and  turnover  in  regulating  MA  across 
industries, especially when the combinations are not detrimental rather beneficial 
to consumers’ interests? More importantly, should there be any flexibility in the 
competition  law  for  objective-specific  assessment  of  MA?  Addressing  these 
questions  in  future  research  is  very  important,  particularly  for  Indian 
pharmaceutical  industry,  as  the  new  product  patent  regime  may  encourage 
innovation and restrict competition in the marketplace. 
Finally, in-house R&D fails to provide any distinct advantage to the firms in terms of 
their profitability. This may largely be because of their low R&D intensity vis-à-vis 
the pharmaceutical companies of the industrially developed countries operating in 
India. Therefore, the very basic question is, can introduction of product patent law 
                                                                                                                                        
performance following mergers in different industries in India. In particular, while mergers seem to have 
had  a  slightly  positive  impact  on  profitability  of  firms  in  the  banking  and  finance  industry,  the 
pharmaceuticals,  textiles  and  electrical  equipment  sectors  saw  a  marginal  negative  impact  on 
profitability  and  returns  on  investment.  For  the  chemicals  and  agri-products  sectors,  mergers  had 
caused a significant decline, both in terms of profitability  and returns on investment and assets. 
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be enough to encourage the firms towards in-house R&D? If not, what should be 
the  policy  measures  to  encourage  in-house  R&D  in  a  greater  way  in  Indian 
pharmaceutical industry? This is very important, as there are serious doubts on the 
positive impact of patents on R&D
13 and alternatives are being talked about. A 
comprehensive pharmaceutical policy should address these issues adequately and, 
therefore, requires further research in this line. 
(The authors are thankful to Professor Rakesh Basant and Dr. Bhagirath Behera for 
their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier draft of the paper.) 
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